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We are helping a task force of the American
Gastroenterology Association to evaluate the
current state of the (decentralized) market for
gastroenterology fellows, and to assess the pros-
pects of reorganizing it via a suitably designed
centralized clearinghouse, a “match.” This mar-
ket used a match from 1986 until the late 1990s.
Starting in 1996, participation in the match de-
clined precipitously, and it was formally aban-
doned after 1999. Consequently, the experience
of this market when the match was in place, in
comparison to the periods before and since,
allows an assessment of the effects of the
match. An analysis of how the match failed in
the 1990s yields insights into the prospects for
success of a new match. These events offer
economists a rare window on how decentralized
labor markets clear, and on how market clear-
inghouses succeed and fail.
I. The Rise and Fall of the Gastroenterology
Match
A gastroenterologist, after graduating from
medical school, completes three years as an
internal medicine resident, and then a gastroen-
terology fellowship. Like many other entry-level
labor markets, gastroenterology experienced
“unraveling” prior to 1986, as offers were made
earlier from year to year, at dispersed times,
well over a year before fellowships began. Such
early offers are typically also “exploding,” they
do not leave candidates time to consider many
other offers (Roth and Xiaolin Xing, 1994;
Niederle and Roth, 2004b).
In 1986, after other attempts to halt unravel-
ing and create a thicker and more orderly mar-
ket, gastroenterology, and a number of other
specialties, were successfully organized through
a centralized match, the Medical Specialties
Matching Program (MSMP), which operates
along the lines of the larger resident match for
ﬁrst-year doctors (cf. Roth, 1984; Roth and
Elliott Peranson, 1999). After a period of inter-
viewing, medical residents and gastroenterol-
ogy program directors ranked each other and
submitted these lists to the match. A version of
a deferred acceptance algorithm (David Gale
and Lloyd Shapley, 1962) produced a stable
matching (i.e., one in which no resident and
program who are not matched together would
both prefer to be). But in the late 1990’s, the
match itself unraveled, as positions were ﬁlled
before the match was conducted.
Up to 1995, well over 300 fellowship posi-
tions were advertised annually through the match,
which attracted at least 1.3 applicants per posi-
tion, with a ﬁll rate of 88 percent and higher. A
planned reduction of 25–50 percent in fellow-
ship positions over ﬁve years began in 1996,
when about 300 positions were advertised. Un-
expectedly, there was an even larger reduction
in the number of applicants, and in 1996 only
0.9 applicants per position participated in the
match, and only about 75 percent of positions
were ﬁlled through the match. While the num-
ber of applicants quickly returned to excess
supply, a perceived shortage of “high quality”
applicants remained, and it seems that many
fellowship programs had lost the conﬁdence to
wait for the match and preferred to make offers
to candidates when they interviewed them. The
next year, 16 percent of the positions initially
advertised through the match were withdrawn,
leaving only 213 positions in the match. In
1998, 60 percent of advertised positions were
withdrawn, leaving only 99 positions in the match,
and in 1999, the last year the match was formally
conducted, only 14 positions participated.
While we know of about a hundred markets
that have been organized by a stable matching
mechanism, we know of only a handful that
have failed (Niederle and Roth, 2004a), and so
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372the cause of the failure of the gastroenterology
match is worth investigating. For this, historical
ﬁeld data can only take us so far. However,
when we reproduce this market on a small scale
in the laboratory (C. Nicholas McKinney et al.,
2005) we can subject the market to different
kinds of supply and demand shocks, under dif-
ferent information conditions.
Our experimental results conﬁrm that it is
hard to unravel a match even through a shock
that reverses which side of the market is short.
In the lab, when applicants were on the long
side of the market, they eagerly accepted early
offers, but programs had little incentive to make
them. When applicants were on the short side
and this was common knowledge, programs
made early offers, but applicants preferred to
wait for the outcome of the match. The feature
of the 1996 market that makes a big difference
in the lab is that the sudden shortage of appli-
cants was unanticipated, and hence applicants
went into the market thinking that positions
would be scarce. So did fellowship programs,
but they were more quickly able to discern the
true state of affairs, when they did not get their
expected number of applications. In this case, in
the experiment, programs made early offers,
and applicants accepted them. And, of course,
once many programs are making early offers,
and having them accepted, then many positions
are withdrawn, and the attraction of waiting for
the match diminishes.
This rare failure of a stable clearinghouse,
following a disruption in supply and demand, also
gives us an unusually clear way to assess what the
clearinghouse accomplished while it was in use.
II. The Effects of a Match
A. Timing and Market Thickness
With the demise of the match, the market
unraveled once again, and interviews for gas-
troenterology fellowships moved steadily ear-
lier (Niederle and Roth, 2004a). Compared to
internal-medicine subspecialties that continued
to use the MSMP, the bulk of gastroenterology
interviews had moved two months earlier for
positions starting in 2003, and three months
earlier for positions starting in 2005 (and 20
months before employment would begin). Inter-
views also became more dispersed. For exam-
ple, there are never as many as 70 percent of the
gastroenterology programs interviewing at the
same time, while the comparably large internal
medicine subspecialties that continue to use the
MSMP have over 70 percent of programs inter-
viewing at the same time for several months.
For gastroenterology, by the time 80 percent of
programs have started interviews, more than 50
percent have already ﬁnished. These differences
between gastroenterology and the subspecialties
that continue to use the match are even more
consequential than they appear, because, for
specialties that use a match, offers do not im-
mediately follow interviews, and candidates can
consider in the match all programs for which
they have interviewed. We conducted a survey
of gastroenterology program directors about the
timing of offers, and the replies conﬁrm that
offers closely follow interviews.
B. The Effects on Mobility: Who Matches to
Whom?
When hiring moves increasingly far in ad-
vance of employment, it may become more
difﬁcult to gather information on candidates, or
to secure reliable commitments from them. For
these reasons, we suspected that unraveling
would be associated with increased reliance on
local networks. And when offers are exploding,
candidates may be able to more readily secure
prompt counteroffers from local programs than
from those that would require distant inter-
views. We therefore examined the mobility of
gastroenterologists, as they moved from their
internal-medicine residency to a fellowship.
In Niederle and Roth (2003b) we tracked the
9,180 fellows who completed both a residency
and a gastroenterology fellowship in the United
States after 1977. Before the match, and since
its demise, fellows were much more likely to
stay at the hospital at which they did their
residency, to remain in the same city, and in the
same state, than during the match. The fact that
mobility declines after the breakdown of the
match makes us more conﬁdent that the increase
in mobility during the match is due to the match
and is not simply an increase in mobility over
time. The effect of the match is bigger for large
(and presumably more prestigious) hospitals,
which employ more fellows from a different
hospital, city, and state.
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fects not only the timing of the market, but also
the outcome, who matches to whom.
III. Does a Match Affect the Terms of
Employment?
In 2002, 16 law ﬁrms ﬁled a class action
lawsuit, on behalf of three former residents,
seeking to represent the class of all residents
and fellows, arguing that the NRMP (the match
for medical residents) violated antitrust laws
and was a conspiracy to depress wages. The
lawsuit was against a class of defendants includ-
ing the NRMP (which also operates the
MSMP), other medical organizations, and the
class of all hospitals that employ residents.
One way to investigate whether a match af-
fects wages of medical fellows is to examine
comparable medical subspecialties, only some
of which use a match. Niederle and Roth
(2003a) compare wages of the 1,148 nonmili-
tary U.S. fellowship programs in all internal-
medicine subspecialties that require three years
of prior residency. Controlling for the hospital,
we ﬁnd that specialties that use a match have no
lower wages than those that do not. Thus it
appears that, in these medical labor markets,
wages are determined by factors other than
whether a centralized clearinghouse is used.
One by-product of the suit is that it brought
renewed attention to the fact that many entry-
level labor markets have impersonal wages that
are part of the job description, so that people
hired at the same time for the same kind of
position by the same ﬁrm may all begin at the
same salary. Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin
(2003) observe that a centralized clearinghouse
may promote this tendency, since positions
have to be offered in the match to all desirable
candidates (i.e., without knowing in advance
who will ﬁll them). They note that many labor
markets that do not use a match also often have
impersonal wages: they mention law, invest-
ment banking, and academia. Bulow and Levin
(2003) show that a market with nonpersonalized
wages tends to lower the average wage and com-
press the wages of applicants compared to a com-
petitive market (see also Ulrich Kamecke, 1998).
The evidence from medical subspecialties
suggests that the absence of a match may pro-
mote neither more personalized wages nor a
more competitive market. The gastroenterology
market became thinner after the demise of the
match, since dispersed exploding offers do not
allow applicants to compare multiple offers.
Reﬂecting these considerations, President
George W. Bush signed into law, as an adden-
dum to the Pension Funding Equity Act of
2004, legislation that included a Congressional
ﬁnding that “Antitrust lawsuits challenging the
matching process, regardless of their merit or
lack thereof, have the potential to undermine
this highly efﬁcient, pro-competitive, and long-
standing process ... .” The legislation goes on to
“conﬁrm that the antitrust laws do not prohibit
sponsoring, conducting, or participating in a
graduate medical education residency matching
program, or agreeing to do so ... .” Following
this legislation, the antitrust suit was dismissed
(although legal skirmishing remains).
IV. Reconstituting a Gastroenterology Match
What issues must the American Gastroenter-
ology Association consider, as it contemplates a
new match? Whether a match is desirable has
the potential to be contentious, because a move
to a later, thicker, more competitive market may
not be a Pareto improvement. Less competitive
programs may, in the present unraveled market,
be able to retain their hospital’s best medical
residents, who would be more mobile in a
match (cf. M. N. Ehrinpreis, 2004). However,
evidence from the early years of the MSMP
suggests that to start a match successfully re-
quires substantial rates of initial participation by
programs.
There are also several kinds of gastroenterol-
ogy fellows, not only clinical fellows, but also
basic science research and clinical research fel-
lows. It appears that some programs may wish
to hire a few research fellows (but not exclu-
sively research fellows), but would like to ﬁll
those research positions with clinical fellows if
they cannot. If so, it may be desirable to design
the match to allow unﬁlled research positions
to “revert” to clinical positions (Roth and
Peranson, 1999; Roth, 2002). For the gastroen-
terology market, an alternative might be to have
the research market operate before the clinical
match.
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To facilitate efﬁciency, markets need to be
thick, and many markets achieve efﬁciency by
aggregating buyers and sellers in time (and
sometimes in space). Unraveling works against
this: dispersed and exploding offers make the
market more like a series of bilateral encounters.
To realize the efﬁciencies that a thick market
allows, the market needs to overcome conges-
tion: having lots of applicants available does not
help if employers only have time to consider a
few of them. Prior to the start of the gastroen-
terology match in 1986, attempts were made to
organize the market simply via a system of rules
about when offers can be made, how long they
must remain open, and so forth. Many markets
have tried and failed to organize themselves by
such rules: the problem is that they experience
congestion, so that not enough offers can be
processed in the available time. (By the time an
offer is rejected, other candidates may no longer
be available, and so employers have incentives
to start making offers earlier, and to leave them
open for less time, which makes the market
unravel.)
Clearinghouses solve both problems: they
bring participants to the market at the same
time, and they overcome congestion.
To more fully understand how a wide variety
of labor markets clear, we need to better under-
stand how, and how well, other decentralized as
well as centralized market institutions perform
these tasks.
Added in proof:
The American Gastroenterology Association
announced in June 2005 that it will reinstate a
match starting in 2006.
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